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ABSTRACT
Mobile crowdsensing allows a large number of mobile devices to
measure phenomena of common interests and form a body of knowl-
edge about natural and social environments. In order to get location
annotations for indoor mobile crowdsensing, reference tags are usu-
ally deployed which are susceptible to tampering and compromises
by aackers. In this work, we consider three types of location-
related aacks including tag forgery, tag misplacement and tag
removal. Dierent detection algorithms are proposed to deal with
these aacks. First, we introduce location-dependent ngerprints
as supplementary information for beer location identication. A
truth discovery algorithm is then proposed to detect falsied data.
Moreover, visiting paerns are utilized for the detection of tag mis-
placement and removal. Experiments on both crowdsensed and
emulated dataset show that the proposed algorithms can detect all
three types of aacks with high accuracy.
1 INTRODUCTION
As a result of ubiquitous sensor peripherals and increasing com-
putation capability of mobile devices, MCS (mobile crowdsensing),
a special form of crowdsourcing where communities contribute
sensing information and human intelligence using mobile devices,
has shown great potential in a variety of environmental, commer-
cial and social applications. Examples include measuring pollution
levels in a city[5], providing indoor localization [17], detecting pot-
holes on a road [12], and many others. Among a variety of MCS
applications, most of them require location tagging. Obtaining
locations is trivial for outdoor applications since the Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) complimented by cellular and WiFi access
map based methods can provide accurate and robust location in-
formation in most outdoor environments. However, this is not the
case for indoor applications. Despite the fact that people spend
majority of their time indoor, indoor positioning systems (IPS) only
have limited success due to the lack of pervasive infrastructural
support, and the desire to keep user devices as simple as possible.
erefore, deploying a set of reference tags seems to be the best
choice in order to provide accurate location tagging in indoor MCS
applications.
As an example, reference tags are instrumental in collecting
crowdsensed data for ngerprint-based indoor localization. Gener-
ally, ngerprint-based localization works in two stages: training
and operational stages. In the training stage, comprehensive site
survey is periodically conducted to record the ngerprints at tar-
geted locations. In the operational stage, when a user submits a
location query with his current ngerprints, a localization server
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Figure 1: An example of using reference tags for indoor mo-
bile crowdsensing. e users are required to upload sensing
data at these tags (red numbered dots).
computes and returns the estimated location. Comprehensive site
survey is time-consuming, labor-intensive, and subjects to environ-
mental changes. is makes it a perfect candidate application for
mobile crowdsensing. Specically, we can deploy a certain number
of reference tags at targeted locations and then recruit volunteers
or workers to contribute ngerprints at these tags.
However, the adoption of reference tag based method is not
without cost. It faces the challenges of incurring additional costs
in deploying the tags and malicious behaviors from users. Tags
such as QR codes, though cost next to nothing, are susceptible to
duplication, damage and removal. As a result, the crowd-sensed
data can be of low quality. For example, a user can easily copy a
QR code and scan it at somewhere else when QR codes are used as
tags. In our previous experience on MobiBee, a game for mobile
crowdsensing, we observed cheats during the data collection[17].
In machine learning, it is well known that “garbage in garbage
out”. Using crowdsensing data with contaminated location tags will
necessarily lead to poor trained models. us, it is important to safe
guard against fraudulent behaviors and falsied data, especially
when incentives are involved.
In this work, we consider three types of aacks for location-
tagged mobile crowdsensed data:
(1) Tag Forgery: An aacker forges one or multiple tags and
uses them to annotate the collected data.
(2) Tag Misplacement: A tag is moved from its designated
place to somewhere else.
(3) Tag Removal: A tag is removed illegally.
We believe that most of the location-related malicious behaviors
can be represented by these three types of aacks. Dierent detec-
tion algorithms are proposed to deal with these aacks. First, as
supplementary information, location-dependent ngerprints are
introduced for beer location identication. A truth discovery al-
gorithm is then proposed to detect falsied data. Moreover, visiting
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paerns are utilized for the detection of tag misplacement and re-
moval. Experiments on both crowdsensed and emulated dataset
show that the proposed algorithms can detect all three types of
aacks with high accuracy.
e rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we provide
a review of the related work in Section 2. e three types of at-
tacks are elaborated in Section 3. Aack detection algorithms are
presented in Section 4. Experimental results are given in Section 5.
Finally, we conclude the paper with summary and future work.
2 RELATEDWORK
ere has been some work on leveraging mobile crowdsensing for
indoor applications. With the booming research on indoor local-
ization, many indoor positioning systems try to take advantage
of MCS. A comprehensive review can be found in [15]. Gener-
ally, these applications fall into two broad categories based on the
purpose: for ngerprinting and for map construction. In the rst
category, schemes such as Zee and LiFS rely on an alternative
odometry based solutions for initial localization or displacement
estimates[19, 24]. MobiBee is a crowdsensing solution for location
ngerprint collection that participants are uncontrolled and uti-
lize their own devices [17]. Several schemes have been proposed
in literatures to construct indoor maps by organically combining
users’ trajectories through pedestrian dead reckoning [6, 21]. ese
schemes dier in how the trajectories are combined. In [3], the
authors propose IndoorCrowd2D to reconstruct the indoor interior
view of a building from crowdsensed data.
Despite many work on indoor positioning system, deploying
reference tags seems to be the simplest to implement. A variety of
techniques, including Radio Frequency Identication (RFID), Near
Field Communication (NFC), ick Response (QR) code, have been
exploited for location reference [2, 10, 13, 22, 23]. ough each of
these techniques has its own advantages, none of them are absolute
safe in terms of is nonforgeability. Security threats in NFC and
RFID have been studied in [8, 9]. QR codes can be easily copied and
spread because they not have any copy protection mechanism. QR
code forgery aack has been reported in our previous work[23]. In
order to provide verications for users’ location claims, location
proof mechanisms have been proposed [7, 20]. However, these
methods require either additional infrastructures or lots of users
which will complicate the design of a mobile crowdsensing system.
Truth discovery is a process to integrate multi-source noisy
information by estimating the reliability of each source. A com-
prehensive survey on truth discovery can be found at [11]. Gen-
erally, a truth discovery task can be modeled in three ways: itera-
tive methods[4], optimization based methods[1], and probabilistic
graphical model based methods[25]. In this work, we formulate the
falsied data detection as a truth discovery problem and propose a
probabilistic graphical model.
3 ATTACKS ON LOCATION TAGS
ere are many security threats that can compromise the data qual-
ity while conducting mobile crowdsensing. In this work, we only
target those that can aect the location tags. e crowdsensed data
with location tags can be described as 〈rid,uid, lid, sensed data〉,
where rid is the record index, uid is the user ID, lid is the location
tag ID, and sensed data is the sensed data. Take the application
of surveying the temperature of a building as an example, we can
deploy a set of reference tags and ask workers to contribute the
temperatures at these tags. Table 1 is a piece of the crowdsensed
data. We categorize these location-related aacks into three types,
i.e., tag forgery, tag misplacement, and tag removal. e rationale
behind these aacks will be discussed in the rest of this section.
3.1 Tag Forgery Attack
e rst and primary type of aack is called tag forgery. During the
operation of MCS, an aacker can forge one or multiple location
tags and use these illegitimate tags to annotate the data. As a
result, the location tags will be compromised. is type of aack
will introduce falsied data and the contributors of these falsied
data can be considered as aackers. Tag forgery can be motivated
by prots or intentions to sabotage. Oen times it is easier to
generate fraudulent data than legitimate ones as the later requires
a participant to physically travel to target locations.
3.2 Tag Misplacement Attack
Another type of aack is tag misplacement. Aer the deployment
of reference tags, some tags may be moved from their designated
places to somewhere else. For example, a tag could be moved by
the custodian if it blocks important signages, or a tag might be
intentionally moved to another place by malicious users. Similar to
tag forgery aack, tag misplacement will introduce falsied data as
well. However, worse than tag forgery, all subsequent data will be
falsied if a tag has been moved. erefore an additional detection
mechanism is required to enable the administrator to correct the
misplaced tags in time.
3.3 Tag Removal Attack
In tag removal, a tag may be removed by accidence or malicious
behaviors. In this case, there will be no falsied data. However,
this type of aacks will lead to an incomplete dataset. In the afore-
mentioned temperature survey example, we might never get the
temperatures at some target locations due to tag removal aack.
erefore, a detection method would be helpful to inform the ad-
ministrator to redeploy the missing tags.
In summary, both tag forgery and tag misplacement can intro-
duce falsied data, and hence a falsied data detection algorithm
is needed. As for tag misplacement and tag removal, actions are
required when the aacks happen. e details of the corresponding
detection algorithms will be elaborated in the following section.
4 ATTACK DETECTION
If the data to be collected contains lile location dependent infor-
mation, it is not possible to detect dierent forms of aacks. To
make our detection algorithms agnostic to individual applications,
we take advantage of the location-dependent ngerprints. We col-
lect these ngerprints in addition to the required data during the
operation of MCS. ese ngerprints serve as additional identica-
tion of location. Location-dependent ngerprints have been well
studied for indoor localization. Classical ngerprints include WiFi
received signal strength (RSS), magnetic eld magnitude, illumi-
nation level etc. In this work, we use WiFi RSS and manetic eld
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Table 1: A demonstration of the formulated attack detection
problem
Raw Crowdsensed Data Output
rid lid uid sensed data FP Time-stamp location
validity
1 loc1 u1 30◦C f p1 2017-1-09 11:20:20 1
2 loc2 u2 31◦C f p2 2017-1-09 12:10:20 0
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magnitude. Note that unlike ngerprinting based localization, we
do not perform site survey to construct ngerprint maps. e prob-
lem can therefore be described as: given a dataset in the form of
〈rid,uid, lid, sensed data, f inдerprint〉, how to detect the three
types of attacks? Table 1 is a demonstration of this aack detec-
tion problem. It is not trivial due to the absence of ground-truth
ngerprint and sensing data at each location.
4.1 Detection of falsied data
4.1.1 Coarse-grained detection. Under the tag forgery and tag
misplacement aacks, the required data along with the ngerprints
are collected at illegitimate locations. Comparing with the reference
tag, the ngerprints are much more dicult to be forged. erefore,
it is possible to lter the contributed data by simply checking the
validity of the associated ngerprints. Specically, we can check
the service set identications (SSIDs) in the ngerprints to detect
problematic scans that do not contain the legitimate SSIDs.
In addition to checking the validity of SSIDs, we can further de-
tect the anomalies based on the time stamps of the contributed data
and the topology information of all location tags. e idea is that
a user needs to travel from one location to another to collect data.
erefore, we can estimate the user’s walking speed based on the
time stamp and topology information of location tags. Under the
tag forgery aack, the aackers do not have to “travel” physically.
For example, an aacker may forge all the location tags and collect
data from the same location but tags them with dierent locations.
A speed anomaly might be detected if this is the case. Formally,
we use 〈Xui ,Xui+1〉 to denote two consecutive uploads contributed
by user u, where Xui = (locui , tsui , · · · ), Xui+1 = (locui+1, tsui+1, · · · ),
where locui represents the location tag and t
u
i is the time stamp. We
ag both Xui and X
u
i+1 as falsied if
dist (locui+1,locui )
tsui+1−tsui > ρ where ρ
is the maximum of human walking/running speed. In our experi-
ments, we set ρ = 10m/s .
ough both SSIDs checking and speed anomaly detection can
benet tag forgery detection, given the small collection of SSIDs
and the ease of changing SSIDs on WiFi APs, such solutions are
likely to work only with unsophisticated perpetrators. ere is a
need to develop more generic detection algorithms.
4.1.2 Truth-discovery based detection. ough it is reasonable to
assume majority of the contributors are honest, one cannot assume
the majority of the collected data is legitimate. Furthermore, it may
be insucient to identify the “bad guy” as the bad guy may still
contribute “good” data. For instance, a perpetrator scans legitimate
tag once before commencing on tag forgery aacks since she has
to explore the legitimate tags anyway. Under these considerations,
we formulate the aack detection problem as a truth discovery
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Figure 2: e probabilistic graphical model
problem. Truth discovery integratesmulti-source noisy information
by estimating the reliability of each source. Interested readers can
refer to [11] for a comprehensive survey on truth discovery.
We rst describe the notations used and then give a formal
denition of the truth discovery problem.
Input. Given a set of locations: K = {k}Kk=1 that we are inter-
ested in, and a set of users (the community)U = {u}Uu=1 which pro-
vide sensing data along with ngerprints from all K locations. e
raw dataset is denoted asX = {(x1,u1, z1, ts1), · · · , (xN ,uN , zN , tsN )},
where xi is the ngerprints (the sensing data can be included if it
is location dependent), zi ∈ K is the location index, ui ∈ U is the
user index, and tsi is the time stamp.
Output. e location validity labels for the given dataset are
denoted as t = (t1, · · · , tN ), where
ti =
{
1 if the location tag zi is truthful
0 if the location tag of zi is falsied.
(1)
Truth Discovery Task. e truth discovery task is formally
dened as estimating µ and t given the raw dataset X.
In order to tackle this problem, we propose a probabilistic graph-
ical model, as illustrated in Figure 2. Specically, we use two Gauss-
ian Mixture Models (GMM) p(x|θT ) and p(x|θ F ) to model the truth-
ful and falsied ngerprints, respectively. For ngerprints with
truthful location tags, each component corresponds to a unique
location. As for ngerprints with falsied location tags, we assume
that all these ngerprints from the same user are collected at the
same illegal location. Hence, each component in the GMM of falsi-
ed data corresponds to a unique user. As such, the total number of
components for p(x|θT ) is K , and the total number of components
for p(x|θ F ) isU . e two models are denoted as
p(x|θT ) =
K∑
k=1
αTk p(x|θTk ) (2)
p(x|θ F ) =
U∑
u=1
αFu p(x|θ Fu ) (3)
with mixing weights that
∑
k α
T
k = 1 and
∑
u α
F
u = 1, θTk =
(µTk , ΣTk ), and θ Fu = (µFu , ΣFu ). Unlike the traditional EM algorithm
for GMM where the component indicator is an unknown hidden
variable, both zi and ui are known in our case. In our model, the
location validity variable ti is considered as hidden variable that
needs to be estimated.
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e associated log-likelihood for the data xi with i ∈ {1, · · · ,N }
is given as L(Θ) = ∑i log∑ti p(xi , ti ;Θ) where Θ = (θT ,θ F , β), β
represents user reliability which will be elaborated later.
For each i , letQi be some distribution over the ti ’s(
∑
ti Qi (ti ) = 1,
Qi (ti ) ≥ 0), then we have
L(θ ) =
∑
i
log
∑
ti
Qi (ti )p(xi , ti ;Θ)Qi (ti ) ≥
∑
i
∑
ti
Qi (ti ) log p(xi , ti ;Θ)Qi (ti )
(4)
In such a seing, the EM algorithm gives us an ecient method
for maximum likelihood estimation. Instead of maximizing L(Θ)
directly, we repeatedly construct a lower bound of L(Θ) (E-step)
and optimize that lower bound (M-step). We can now write down
the sequence of our EM algorithm for our truth discovery task:
E − step : For each i , set (5)
Qi (ti ) = p(ti |xi ,θT ,θ F , β) = p(xi |ti ,θ
T ,θ F ) · p(ti |β)
C
(6)
M − step : Set (7)
Θ = argmax
Θ
∑
i
∑
ti
Qi (ti ) log p(xi , ti ;θ )
Qi (ti ) (8)
where βu is the reliability of user u and βu = 1 if all the the data
from user u are completely truthful, p(ti = 1|β) = βui , and C is a
constant. Let us dene
J (Q,Θ) =
∑
i
∑
ti
Qi (ti ) log p(xi , ti ;Θ)
Qi (ti ) (9)
en we can maximize J (Q,Θ) with respect to θT , θ F , and β re-
spectively,
∂ J (Q, Θ)
∂θTk
=
∑
i :zi=k
Qi (ti = 1)
∂
∂θTk
p(xi |θTk )
p(xi |θTk )
= 0 (10)
∂ J (Q, Θ)
∂θ Fu
=
∑
i :ui=u
Qi (ti = 0)
∂
∂θ Fu
p(xi |θ Fu )
p(xi |θ Fu )
= 0 (11)
∂ J (Q, Θ)
∂βu
= 0 (12)
Aer straightforward derivations, we can update θT , θ F and β in
M-step as:
αTk =
∑
i :zi=k Qi (ti = 1)∑
i Qi (ti = 1)
(13)
µTk =
∑
i :zi=k Qi (ti = 1)xi∑
i :zi=k Qi (ti = 1)
(14)
ΣTk =
∑
i :zi=k Qi (ti = 1)(xi − µTk )(xi − µTk )>∑
i :zi=k Qi (ti = 1)
(15)
α Fu =
∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 0)∑
i Qi (ti = 0)
(16)
µFu =
∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 0)xi∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 0)
(17)
ΣFu =
∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 0)(xi − µFu )(xi − µFu )>∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 0)
(18)
βu =
∑
i :ui=u Qi (ti = 1)∑
i :ui=u 1
(19)
Hallway1 2
3
(a) A normal size-3 trajectory (b) An abnormal size-3 trajectory
3
Hallway1 2
3
Been moved
Figure 3: An example of normal and abnormal length-3 tra-
jectories. In (b), tag 3 has been moved from dotted circle to
solid circle.
With these, we can estimate the hidden variable ti repeatedly
until convergence. Similar to standard EM, the convergence of
our algorithm can be proved by showing that our choice of the
Qi ’s always monotonically improves the log-likelihood. In the nal
falsied data detection algorithm, the coarse-grained method is
performed in the beginning and the result is used as the initial
value of t.
4.2 Detecting tag misplacement
e detection of tag misplacement is based on the visiting paern of
location tags. In indoor MCS, it is likely that a user will contribute
sensing data in a continuous manner. All sensing data uploaded
from user u can be sorted in chronological order and represented as
traju = 〈(locu1 , tsu1 ), (locu2 , tsu2 ), · · · 〉. We dene a length-m trajec-
tory of user u as trajum,i = 〈(locui , tsui ), · · · , (locui+m−1, tsui+m−1)〉
where trajum,i is a subsequence of traj
u and tsj+1 − tsj ≤ TW for
any i ≤ j ≤ i +m − 2, TW is a time dierence threshold.
Given TW , the raw data set X = {X1, · · · ,XN } can be eas-
ily transformed into a set of length-3 trajectories which can be
used for tag misplacement detection. We introduce the normal
and abnormal length-3 trajectories. A length-3 trajectory traju,3i =〈(locui , tsui ), (locui+1, tsui+1), (locui+2, tsui+2)〉 is normal ifdist(locui+2, locui ) ≥
dist(locui+1, locui ), and abnormal otherwise. Figure 3 provides an
example of normal and abnormal length-3 trajectories. Although an
occasional abnormal length-3 trajectory does not necessarily mean
tag misplacement, frequent abnormal length-3 trajectories around
a location tag usually implies that this tag has been moved. Based
on this observation, a threshold based tag misplacement detection
algorithm is described as Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1: tag misplacement detection
Input: Raw dataset: X
Output: A set of misplaced location tags
Initialize each countlock to 0;
traj3 = a set of length-3 trajectories generated from X;
for
traj3,ui ≡ 〈(locui , tsui ), (locui+1, tsui+1), (locui+2, tsui+2)〉 ∈ traj3
do
if traj3i is abnormal then
countloci+1 = countloci+1 + 1;
Sort 〈loc1, · · · , locK 〉 in descending order based on count ;
Flag the top-ranking lock s as misplaced;
4
Table 2: e details of two datasets
MobiBee Dataset Emulated Dataset
# of location tag 24 50
# of user 5 20
# of aacker 2 5
# of record 21722 17487
# of falsied record 8338 3186
# of misplaced tags 0 5
# of removed tags 0 5
4.3 Detection of tag removal
In real world, a reference tag could be removed on purpose or
by accidence. Once a tag has been removed, it will never show
up in the rest of data collection except that it might be forged
by some aackers. e detection of tag removal relies on the ob-
servation that a tag could have been removed if it does show up
but its adjacent tags show up frequently. Based on this observa-
tion, the tag removal aack can be detected by comparing the
frequency of a tag with the frequencies of its neighbors. Con-
cretely, all location tags can be ranked in ascending order based on
f r eqlock
mean({f r eqneiдhbork1 ,f r eqneiдhbork2 , · · · })
, wheredist(neiдhborkj , lock ) ≤
ϕ. e distance threshold ϕ is set to 5m in our experiment. en
the top-ranking location tags can be agged as removed. In prac-
tice, this detection method can be easily converted to an online
algorithm by seing a threshold.
5 EVALUATION AND RESULTS
5.1 Two datasets
e experiments are based on both crowdsensed and emulated
dataset. e real world dataset is collected by a treasure hunt game
MobiBee which is designed for location dependent ngerprint col-
lection. QR codes are used as location tags. Various incentive
strategies, including monetary, entertainment and competition, are
utilized for beer user participation. More details can be found
in [17] about the game design. Over the one month operation, 26
users have signed up the game but only 14 of them actually con-
tribute data. In the experiments, we select 5 users who contribute
the vast majority of the data. During the operation of MobiBee, two
users have been found cheating which can be categorized as tag
forgery aack. However, both tag misplacement and tag removal did
not appear in the data collection of MobiBee. erefore, another
dataset is needed to evaluate the performances of proposed tag
misplacement and tag removal detection algorithms.
e second dataset is constructed by emulation. Concretely,
we develop a ngerprint collection app. Several volunteers are
recruited to travel around inside the target building and upload
sensing data at a set of pre-selected locations. e trajectories
of these volunteers are carefully designed to imitate the actual
scenario of MCS. 20 users have been emulated and each user has
been to every location at least once. 5 users have been designed
as aackers who perform tag forgery aack. 5 location tags are
moved to illegitimate places during the data collection, as the result
of tag misplacement aack. Similarly, another 5 location tags are
removed at some points, as the result of tag removal. e details of
the two datasets are given in Table 2.
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Figure 4: Gaussian kernel density estimation of ngerprints
collected at dierent locations
Table 3: e performance of falsied data detection algo-
rithm
MobiBee
Dataset
Emulated Dataset
(coarse-grained)
Emulated Dataset
(Integrated)
Overall Accuracy 88.4% 83.4% 87.2%
Precision for Falsied
Data
87.2% 100% 62%
Recall for Falsied
Data
81.7% 8.9% 77.6%
5.2 Performance of falsied data detection
In section 4.1, we model the ngerprints collected from dierent
locations as Gaussian Mixture. e Gaussianality of ngerprints
collected from the same location is demonstrated as Figure 4.
Two users have been found cheating in MobiBee. e falsied
instances in MobiBee dataset were rst detected by SSID checks and
are further conrmed by interviewing the respective perpetrators,
and thus the veried data is used as ground truth. erefore, the
coarse-grained detection methods are not used for MobiBee dataset.
As for the emulated dataset, it is a dierent story since we know
the ground truth in the rst place. erefore, both coarse-grained
detection algorithm and truth discovery based algorithm are applied
on the emulated dataset. e experiment results show that the
proposed algorithm can successfully detect falsied data with high
accuracy. e detailed results of the experiments on two dierent
datasets are reported as Table 3. Note that, the recall of the coarse-
grained detection algorithm is very low whereas the precision is
very high, which means that although coarse-grained detection
approach is accurate it is not capable enough to capture all falsied
data. Aer integrating the truth discovery algorithm, we can see
that the recall has been signicantly improved despite that the
precision is sacriced. While detecting falsied data, False Negative
(FN) error is more harmful than False Positive error (FP), since it can
contaminate the dataset. In this sense, combining coarse-grained
and truth discovery algorithm is more desirable.
5.3 Estimation of user reliability β
A side output of the truth discovery algorithm in Section 4.1.2 is
user reliability β . For MobiBee dataset, there are 5 users in total
and 2 of them were found cheating. Aer the convergence of the
algorithm, the estimated β1−5 are listed in the rst row of Table 4.
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Table 4: e estimated user reliability
Estimation
MobiBee DS
β1−5 [0.97129253, 0.32158027, 1., 0.96290124, 0.522175211]
Simulated DS
β1−5 [0.5121315 , 0.67818931, 0.66130878, 0.61648436, 0.62845224]
β6−10 [0.33275762, 0.46122064, 0.42303993, 0.46608656, 0.30396718]
β11−15 [0.91738818, 0.95683221, 0.93786919, 0.97727463, 1.0]
β16−20 [0.97310623, 0.93121491, 0.98167733, 0.99308929, 0.96049801]
is estimation is consistent to the ground truth that user 2 and
5 are aackers. While using the emulated dataset, the estimated
user reliabilities are provided in the rest of Table 4. We can easily
observe that user 1-10 have relatively worse reliability than others.
is accurately reects the fact that user 1-5 upload some data from
misplaced tags, and user 6-10 are aackers who upload some data
using forged tags.
5.4 Performance of tag misplacement detection
According to Table 2, only the emulated dataset contains tag mis-
placement aack and hence is used to evaluate the tag misplacement
detection performance. Tag {5, 15, 25, 35, 45} were actually moved
during the data collection. Based on Algorithm 1, the top-10 candi-
dates of misplaced tags are {5, 15, 25, 45, 29, 12, 33, 35, 20, 14}, which
capture all 5 misplaced location tags. We will capture 4 out of 5
misplaced tags if we ag top-5 candidates as misplaced.
5.5 Performance of tag removal detection
Similar to the evaluation of tag misplacement detection, only the
emulated dataset is utilized to evaluate the performance of tag
removal detection. As ground truth, tag 3, 10, 20, 30, 40 were
actually removed in the meantime of data collection. Using the
method described in section 4.3, the top-10 candidates of removed
tags are {10, 40, 30, 21, 17, 3, 34, 23, 43, 13} which successfully cover
4 out 5 removed tags. 3 removed tags will be successfully detected
if top-5 candidates are agged as removed.
6 SUMMARY AND FUTUREWORK
In this work, we abstracted three types of location-related aacks
in indoor mobile crowdsensing. Additional location dependent
ngerprints are collected as supplementary information for falsi-
ed data detection. Moreover, another two detection methods are
proposed to detect tag misplacement and tag removal. In order to
evaluate the proposed detection methods, both crowdsensed and
emulated datasets are employed. Experiment results have shown
that the proposed aack detection algorithms can indeed detect
aacks with high accuracy. As a part of the future work, we would
like to explore some more sophisticated detection algorithms for
tag misplacement and tag removal and investigate other types of
security threats in mobile crowdsourcing.
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